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THE LEGACY OF CIVIL LAW*
Pan. J. Zepos**
It has been an exceptional privilege and a particular honor for
me to be invited to give this first lecture in honor of John H. Tucker,
jr., at once an eminent scholar and an invaluable and highly es-
teemed friend.
When, in 1961, I was fortunate enough to stay at the Tulane Law
School of New Orleans, as a visiting professor for a series of lectures
on matters of Greek Law, I had a unique opportunity to attend some
courses by distinguished American colleagues, among which were the
courses on Roman Law then given by Mr. John H. Tucker, jr., so
justly honored today. I will always remember those courses that testi-
fied to the man's wisdom and erudition. I will also keep a vivid
recollection of our long discussions in New Orleans, through which I
had the good chance of getting better acquainted not only with the
learned scholar but with the charming conversationalist and noble-
minded man who - allow me to note - has since honored me with
his sincere friendship.
It does not fall to me to analyze here today John H. Tucker's
work and scientific contribution. This task devolves upon others,
much more competent than I. To me, it suffices today that the illus-
trious Law School of the Louisiana State University has thought it
its duty to honor John H. Tucker for his contribution as a scholar and
teacher, as Chairman of the Louisiana State Law Institute and mem-
ber of many learned societies, and finally as an enthusiastic promoter
of research on Civil Law, which this State still attends with the same
zest as does our aged Europe across the ocean. This is all I need, to
offer John H. Tucker, with honor, respect and love, this lecture on
"The Legacy of Civil Law" - a subject I feel to be so close to the
aspirations and efforts of the honored jurist.
I
The term Civil Law is known to be used with diverse
connotations. We speak of Civil Law as opposed to Criminal Law or
Canon Law, Commercial or Maritime Law. We also speak of Civil
Law as synonymous with Private Law in general. But we primarily
* This was the first of the Tucker Lecture Series, and was delivered at the Louis-
iana State University Law School on June 7, 1972. The bibliography mentioned in the
following footnotes is a selected general bibliography, in which the reader may find
more detailed references.
** Professor of Law, University of Athens, Greece.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
speak of Civil Law as distinguished from Common Law, that is to say
as the legal system historically developed, mainly in continental Eu-
rope under the influence of Roman Law and transplanted from Eu-
rope to other areas of the world, except where the Anglo-Saxon law
system or the religious laws of the Moslems or the Buddhists or others
established their ascendancy.'
It is this concept of Civil Law as the legal system evolved mainly
in continental Europe as a facet of the age-long evolution of Roman
Law that will be used here. In this sense, Civil Law, along with
Common Law and the diverse religious laws, has been and still is one
of the three forces, which from the standpoint of law, at once divide
and move the whole world to this very day. And when we speak of
the "Legacy of Civil Law", we refer to the significance of that law to
civilization as a whole, the essence and scope of its meaning and,
lastly, its instrumentality in regulating human relations from the
standpoint of law, i.e., of a rhythm of social life with a possibility of
enforcement and coercion.
So, Civil Law is a European law. But with this statement, the
question is immediately raised: what is this Europe, what is this con-
tinent where a uniform conception of law emerges as an element of
the civilization and culture shared by all Europeans? Simple though
it may appear at first glance, the question is actually very hard to
answer if we try to give the geographical boundaries of that continent
in terms of its cultural significance. Although Europe is defined as
the continent extending from the Urals to the Atlantic - the natural
boundaries that make it a distinct mass of land - from the viewpoint
of culture, we would find it hard to accept the whole of that expanse
as Europe; we could hardly accept the culture that governs human
relationships developing all over that expanse as European culture.
On the other hand, we may fearlessly brand as European that culture
which, in certain historical periods, started out from Europe and
spread - through migrations, colonizations, or sheer imitation - to
vast areas of all the four other continents.
It is not the purpose of this lecture to discuss this complex prob-
lem of the-meaning of Europe. Besides, so much has been said and
written on the subject that discussions need not be repeated here. It
may be enough to recall a few names of famed authors, such as
Christopher Dawson, Henri Pirenne, Paul Koschaker, or even Erich
Genzmer and Franz Wieacker, to whose weighty opinions I can safely
refer for the many scholarly ideas they taught in recent decades about
1. See R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 245 n.22, 251 (3d ed. 1970); R. DAVID &
J. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY nos. 18-53 (1968).
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European civilization in general and the significance of law as an
element of that civilization in particular.'
In searching for the root of the common European spirit in the
realm of law, one should certainly not stop at the general mention of
Europe by Herodotus in relation to the Greeks.' When it comes to the
realm of law, the root of that common European spirit lies in the law
of the Roman world-empire, the final phase of which is represented
by the Justinian legislation in the form it took in the 6th century'
It was Justinian, that great Byzantine emperor, who conceived
the ambitious plan of restoring the Roman Empire and establishing
in it one law and one faith and also one language - the Greek lan-
guage. "One State, one Law, and one Church" - such was the brief
formula of Justinian's entire political career, says A. A. Vasiliev, the
eminent Byzantinologist, in his "History of the Byzantine Empire."'
And this formula succinctly expresses the founding of European civi-
lization on these three elements - the State, Law, and Religion - as
well as on language, on which the other elements of every civilization,
such as learning and science, the economy, the arts, and so forth,
have since been pivoting. Justinian's age marks the advent of some
kind of "European" law, at least some law, for what was then the
consequential portion of Europe. It is my humble opinion that, at
least as far as law is concerned, we cannot help viewing Justinian's
times as the most decisive period for the foundation of the European
spirit in the history of law.
As a matter of fact, we may even trace the origin of the idea of
"one state, one law, one religion" as far back as the fourth century,
to the days of Constantine the Great, founder of the Byzantine state.
However, in Constantine's times there was not yet as much "sociabil-
ity" and as much "force" as displayed by the age of Justinian in the
realm of law. In these developments, the sophistication and refine-
ment of man's nature through ethics and religion were raised to the
level of substantial cultural forces and they definitely consecrate Eth-
ical Culture which, at least in the case of law, was to start out on a
2. C. DAWSON, THE MAKING OF EUROPE (1935); H. PIRENNE, MALROMET ET
CHARLEMAGNE (1936); P. KOSCHAKER, EUROPA UND DAs ROMISCHE RECHT (2d ed. 1953);
see also many contributions of other authors published in L'EUROPA E. IL DIRrrrO RO-
MANO, STUDI IN MEMORIA DI P. KOSCHAKER (1954); E. GENZMER, IL DIRITTO ROMANO COME
FATTORE DELLA CIVILTA EUROPEA, in CONFERENZE ROMANISTICHE (1954); F. WIEACKER,
PRIVATRECHTSGESCHICHTE DER NEUZEIT 26 (2d ed. 1967).
3. HERODOTUS, HISTORY 1.4 (The Loeb Classical Library ed. 1966): "The Persians
claim Asia for their own, and the foreign nations that dwell in it; Europe and the Greek
race they hold to be separate from them." See also II. 16, IV. 36, I1. 115, and IV. 45.
4. A. VASILIEV, HISTORY OF THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE 148 (1952).
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really glorious march in later times.5
After Justinian, the great milestone in the development of a
spirit of European law was undoubtedly the Christmas Day of A.D.
800, when Pope Leo HI crowned Charlemagne emperor in Rome. A
Frankish-German as well as Christian empire was thus emerging,
which was to live long enough in Europe a life parallel to that of the
Greek-Christian Byzantine Empire.' Europe was thus taking its final
cultural form, composed of Greek, Roman, Frankish-Germanic, and
Christian elements. The gradual Hellenization of the Byzantine state
in eastern Europe, the gradual assertion of the Roman political con-
cept of the "Imperium" in western Europe, plus the spiritual domina-
tion of Christianity in both west and east, have definitively molded
the foundations of European civilization. And these foundations
historically rested on the contributions made to the intellectual, pol-
itical, and moral civilization by the three symbol-cities - Athens,
Rome and Jerusalem. The European civilization was born. And that
civilization was to spread gradually, by the 19th and 20th centuries,
all over the geographical extent of Europe when, after Islam's with-
drawal, the Balkans were liberated and when Russia finally sought a
place for herself within that same civilization.
I cannot dwell any further on these matters, which are obviously
of much broader scope than the subject of immediate concern. How-
ever, a general contemplation of such broader matters was inevitable
here, considering that the legacy of civil law, that is, the significance
of European Roman law, can only be grasped within the context of
the historical evolution of European civilization as a whole.
II
It should indeed be borne in mind that Law, whatever the philo-
sophical sense in which it is conceived, is in any event an expression
and an element of the whole civilization in a certain space and certain
time. The reason is that civilization is an aggregate of the values
historically evolved which, as a single organic whole, are handed
down from generation to generation for the purpose of taming man
and his social life. There can be no question that this taming is what
is also sought by law as a rhythm of social living together, in other
5. For Constantine the Great, see, G. OSTROGORSKY, GESCHICHTE DES
BYZANTINLSCHEN STAATES (2d ed 1952); M. ROSTOVTZEFF, 2 GESELLSCHAFT UND WIRT-
SCHAFTr IM RoMISCHEN KAISERREICH 210 (1930); N. BAYNES, CONSTANTINE THE GREAT AND
THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH (1929); A. PIGANIOL, L'EMPEREUR CONSTANTIN (1932); J. VOOT,
CONSTANTIN DER GROSSE UND SEIN JAHRHUNDERT (1949).
6. See P. KOSCHAKER, EUROPA UND DAS RoMISCHE RECHT (2d ed. 1953); F.
WIEACKER, PRIVATRECHTSGESCHICHTE DER NEUZEIT 216 (2d ed. 1967).
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words, as a cultural element with effective consequences.
Roman law has been undoubtedly one such cultural element for
Europe and has been the basis on which the European Civil Law was
built. It is, therefore, worth retracing briefly the evolutionary path
which Roman Law and its theory have trodden before crystallizing
into a European Civil Law in our own days. This is the only way we
can grasp both the importance and the meaning of Civil Law, the
"Legacy of Civil Law."
We need not say much about the history and development of
Roman Law down to the times of the great European codifications.
Through the schools of the Glossators and post-Glossators or com-
mentators, then through the humanists and the disciples of the
School of Natural Law, and lastly through the teachings of the disci-
ples of the Historical School and the Pandectists, that history and
development are very well known.' The point is that the elaboration
of Roman Law met with different fates in eastern and western
Europe. When eastern Europe fell to Islam, the elaboration of Roman
Law was confined to western Europe, where, refolded and renewed,
it finally became in essence a law common to the peoples who sur-
vived, or were spared by, the Islamic flood.
In eastern Europe, Roman Law was enriched with many Greek,
Oriental and Christian elements, and in the form of Byzantine law,
it enjoyed a long and unbroken life for a thousand years or more.
When, in 1453, that empire was finally shattered under the blows of
Islam, the Byzantine legal compilations had such luster that their
force, tolerated by the conquerors, was preserved among the enslaved
Christians throughout the duration of the Ottoman occupation, and
their radiance reached undiminished as far as Russia, Armenia and
other eastern countries. The history of Byzantine law was enriched
with the living history of the so-called post-Byzantine law. These
laws have been an evidence of the survival of the idea of European
law established in eastern Europe since the times of Justinian!
The fate of the Roman Law in western Europe was entirely differ-
ent. There, with the invasion of Germanic tribes - the Goths, the
Franks, the Vandals, the Longobards, and others - the Western
Roman Empire was finally destroyed in A.D. 476. Since then some
7. See P. VINOGRADOFF, ROMAN LAW IN MEDIAEVAL EUROPE (2d ed. 1929).
8. See the brief survey in P. ZEPOS, GREEK LAW 24 (1949); K. VON LINGENTHAL,
GESCHICHTE DES GRIECHISH-ROMISCHEN RECHTS (3d ed 1892); Heimbach, Griechish-
romisches Recht in Mittelaeter und in der Neuzeit, 87 ERSCH UND GRUBER, ALLGEMEINE
ENCYCLOPADIE DER WISSENSCHAFTEN UND KUNSTE 1 (1869). P. Collinet, Byzantine
Legislation, 4 THE CAMBRIDGE MEDIEVAL HISTORY 706 (1936); E. FRESHFIELD, ROMAN
LAW IN THE LATER ROMAN EMPIRE (1932).
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general decline of the whole civilization can be observed. But Roman
Law was not altogether extinct. In fact, in Spain and the south of
France, even in Germany and primarily in Italy, it was preserved in
the "leges barbarorum" often influenced by Roman Law, in the
"leges romanae", some rudimentary teaching in the "rhetorical
schools" and also through imitation in the drafting of notarial docu-
ments. But it was primarily with the evergrowing ascendancy of the
Church that Roman Law, clearly influencing the formative process
of Canon Law, was kept alive during those dark ages, before it be-
came stronger after the foundation of Charlemagne's empire about
the year 800. Thus, though neglected, Roman Law survived during
those centuries until about 1100. And it is perhaps since those times
that traces of a certain vulgarism can be detected in Roman Law -
that vulgarism which the learned researches by the eminent Roman-
ist Ernest Levy and later scholars have established as a peculiar
manifestation of Roman Law in medieval or earlier times.9
In any event, it is around the year 1100 that the study of Roman
Law, as well as its fate, reach their great and decisive turning point.
The development of new political, social and economic conditions,
the increase in international communications and international
trade, the rise of the Church to the status of a political force, and a
renewed interest in the study of the Classics and the fine arts, also
had their effects in the research on Roman Law and the renewal of
its study. The universities of Pavia and Bologna in northern Italy
were the cradles of that renewed interest. Particularly in Bologna,
with the use of the discovered manuscripts of the Justinian legislation
and especially of the Digest, Irnerius and his disciples subjected the
sources of Roman Law to a systematic study and became the founders
of the glorious school of the Glossators. Since the 13th century, the
post-Glossators, with Bartolus and Baldus as their foremost repre-
sentatives, turned their attention to an inquiry into the practical
applications of Roman Law in Italy and they were followed by imita-
tors in other countries of western Europe. In fact, since the 15th
century, chairs of Roman Law were founded in France, Germany,
Spain, Holland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and even in England; and
universities awarded the title of "Doctor Utriusque Iuris", that is, of
both Roman and Canon Laws. The research on Roman Law thus
9. The bibliography is very rich. See F. WIEACKER, GRUNDER UND BEWAHRER (1959),
VOM ROMISCHEM RECHT (1961), PRIVATRECHTSGESCHICHTE DER NEUZEIT (2d ed. 1967); E.
WOLF, GROSSE RECHTSDENKER DER DEUTSCHEN GEISTESGESCHICHTE (4th ed. 1963). On the
problem of "vulgarization" see E. LEvy, 1 GASAMMELTE SCHRIFTEN 163 (1963), WEST
ROMAN VULGAR LAW, THE LAW OF PROPERTY (1951), WESTROMISCHES VULGARRECHT, DAS
OBLIGATIONENRECHT (1956); M. KASER, 2 ROMISCHES PRIVATRACHT 3, 13 (1959).
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became a common cause for the peoples of Europe. And that common
cause became more and more appealing with the teachings of later
schools (e.g., the "elegant" school of the humanists, mainly French,
during the Renaissance: Cujacius, Donnelus, and others), with the
development of the idea of "usus modernus Pandectarum" (modem
use of the Pandects, both in the law-courts and in the doctrine of
Germanic countries), with the philosophy of the School of Natural
Law (Grotius, Puffendorf, Thomasius) which began to submerge con-
tinental Europe in the 17th century, and lastly with the Historical
School of G. Hugo and Savigny and its extension in the teaching of
the Pandectists of the 19th century in Germany.'"
This is how Roman Law asserted itself both in doctrine and
practice in modern times. As far as practice is concerned, the gradual
"reception" of Roman Law, already begun in the 13th or 14th century
in various countries of western Europe, finally came to consolidate,
about 1600, the concept that Roman Law was the common European
law, the inexhaustible source for legal ideas as well as practical solu-
tions."
The reception of Roman Law is a remarkable phenomenon in the
history of European civilization in general as well as in the history of
European law in particular. In fact, the gradual penetration by
Roman Law differed both in form and extent in each European coun-
try, from Spain to the Scandinavian countries and from France to
Italy and Germany. But a common feature of that penetration by
Roman Law and its spirit was that the "Corpus Juris Civilis", as
studied and interpreted from the times of the Glossators, had been
diffused into the legal life of European peoples through the combined
efforts of professors, judges and practitioners. Of course, Roman Law
has had to vie with local laws, especially the customary law of the
various countries. From this struggle, however, Roman Law very
often emerged as the victor. The reason is that, with the gradual turn
to the study of classical texts and the more systematic structure of
the interpretation of Roman Law, the luster of that written law as-
serted its supremacy; and the "ratio.scripta" formed, if not directly
the law in force, at least an extensive subsidiary authority. Roman
Law thus became a common cultural achievement in Europe, with
10. See generally P. VINOGRADOFF, ROMAN LAW IN MEDIAEVAL EUROPE (2d ed. 1929);
L. WENGER, DIE QUELLEN DES ROMISCHEN RECHTS § 86, 726 (1953).
11. On the "reception" see note 10 supra; see also M. CONRAT, GESCHICHTE DER
QUELLEN UND LITERATUR DES ROMISCHEN RECHTS IM FRUHEREN MInTELALTER (1891); F.
CALASSO, 1 MEDIaO EVO DEL DIRITTO (1954); W. KUNKEL, Das Wesen der Rezeption des
Romischen Rechts, HEIDELBERGER JAHRBUCHER (1957); G. von Below, Die Ursachen der
Rezeption des Romischen Rechts in Deutschland, 19 HISTORISCHE BIBLIOTHEK (1905);
M. KASER, ROMISCHE RECHTSGESCHICHTE 12, 278, 284 (2d ed. 1967).
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the exception of England, where the reaction was particularly strong
and paved the way to a molding of the Common Law system. When
new concepts of the State and of sovereignty as well as new relations
of commercial communication evolved in continental Europe, that is,
when new concepts of public, administrative, criminal and proce-
dural law, as well as of commercial and maritime law developed,
what remained of Roman Law became essentially Civil Law. And it
was this Civil Law of Roman origin, together with the Customary Law
of the various European countries, that formed the chief source of
inspiration for the great codifications that made their appearance
mainly in the early 19th century."
IIn
To be exact, these codifications made their appearance in Eu-
rope, in the late 18th century or even earlier. Thus, in distant Russia,
Catherine the Great took much pride in publishing in 1767 the "Gen-
eral Principles for the Drawing of a New Code", prompted by the
spirit of enlightment; in the Scandinavian countries the idea of codi-
fication had appeared much earlier. Moreover, some of the German
Lander had similarly made codifications, e.g., Bavaria in 1756 and
especially Prussia in 1794. Lastly, in the Danubian countries, in
Walachia and Moldavia, the Byzantine and post-Byzantine laws
found their codified forms in a series of important legislative compila-
tions such as the Legal Handbook of Michael Photeinopoulos (1765),
the Legal Constitution of Alexander Hypsilantis (1780), the Mol-
davian Civil Code (1817), the Walachian Code (1818), and others.'3
Thus, central and eastern, northern and southern Europe histori-
cally preceded western Europe in the codification process. Neverthe-
less, we usually speak of this phenomenon in contemplation of the
series of great legislative compilations that appeared in the early 19th
century, starting with publication of the French Civil Code of 1804.
And rightly so, for in this Code and the Austrian General Civil Code
that followed it in 1811 as well as in all subsequent civil codes pub-
lished in the course of the 19th and 20th centuries there is one ele-
ment in common, particularly characteristic of the impact of the age-
12. See Rabel, Private Laws of Western Civilization, 10 LA. L. REv. 1 (1950); H.
COING, DIE URISPRUNGLICHE EINHEIT DER EUROPAISCHEN RECHTSWISSENCHAFT 155 (1968);
G. KEGEL, Sinn und Grenzen der Rechtsangleichung, 11 KOLNER SCHRIFTEN ZUM
EUROPARECHT 9 (1969).
13. On these codifications in the Danubian Countries, see P. Zepos, L'influence
du droit byzantin sur la l6gislation roumaine de la pdriode des princes phanariotes, 1
STUDI IN MEMORIA DI P. KOSCHAKER, L'EUROPA E IL DIarrro ROMANO 429 (1953),
Byzantine Law in the Danubian Countries, 7 BALKAN STUDIES 343 (1966).
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long Roman Law tradition printed in those texts.
These codes became the law of the new states required by the
principle of nationalities; this means that these codifications were
political, liberal and nationalistic achievements, which in a certain
sense express the liberal and nationalistic spirit typical of the 19th
and 20th centuries. Thus, the codes of that period were new texts in
relation to the earlier law prevailing in each individual country. In
this sense, it would be an error to say that they basically formulated
in articles and paragraphs the Roman Law which had developed into
a law common to all Europe in the preceding period." Nonetheless,
in spite of their individuality and their aspirations to lay down a new
law, the 19th and 20th century codes could not break away from their
historical background. That historical background was the amalgam-
ated legal system that had been fashioned in Europe out of strong
elements of Roman Law and equally strong elements of local custom-
ary law, the whole enriched with the teachings of the Romanists, the
Canonists and especially of the School of Natural Law. That amal-
gam had imported to the realm of law, as noted earlier, a certain
special character of a general European spirit. And that European
spirit could not be by-passed or ignored in drawing the European
codes, considering that codes are, by themselves, elements of culture
and that culture is by its very essence an organic force handed down
by generation to generation. The European codes of the 19th and 20th
centuries certainly aspired to introduce a new, clear-cut law. But that
law as a cultural force was necessarily bound to the precedent Euro-
pean spirit. The 19th and 20th century codifications were European
codifications that gave expression to the general European spirit
evolved over the centuries under the influence of Roman and other
elements.
This remark becomes even clearer if we recall the historical ori-
gin of some of the basic principles and some of the basic institutions
of European codes. Of these principles and institutions, some do
derive from genuine Roman conceptions while others do not. Among
the latter, it may be noted that the so-called right of personality and
the related recognition of the right to reparation of moral damages,
as formulated especially in the Swiss and other codes, are acquisi-
tions of modern times when, under the influence of general philo-
sophical ideas, the concept of "personality" was recognized as an
individual and necessary logical category and as an "aim in itself'
in the system of law. Likewise, marriage became an institution
clearly influenced by Canon Law teachings, especially in respect of
14. On the whole problem see R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN
THE WORLD TODAY nos. 18-53 (1968).
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the distinctions into inexistence, nullity, and annullability. Also the
protection of bona fide purchaser of chattels, was formulated in Euro-
pean codes mainly on the basis of German customary laws. Again, the
expansion of the principle of strict liability observed in modern laws
was necessitated by social and economic considerations which form
the basis of the theory of professional risk developed in modern times.
As another example of a basic principle of law, the principle of free-
dom of agreement, basically derived from the teachings of the Canon-
ists and scholars of the School of Natural Law, has suffered and is
still suffering many restrictions from social and economic considera-
tions. None of these principles and institutions is of Roman origin.
In contrast, however, there is a host of principles and institutions
which basically express Roman conceptions in the modern European
codes and which hardly need a specific mention. Among these may
be noted the concept of ownership which, despite its elaboration by
means of all kinds of "social" restrictions, is still basically Roman.
Also still basically Roman is the regulation of intestacy in the law of
inheritance, even though this too has been somewhat adulterated
with the acceptance of the "parentel" system. Equally Roman is the
principle of favoring the debtor which underlies the whole system of
the law of contracts in order to protect the weak against the strong.
And to cite one more example, Roman also is the principle of the
observance of good faith in the performance of obligations which,
enriched with Teutonic ideas over the centuries, still basically origi-
nates from the Roman conception of "bona fides."
This last principle merits our particular attention. The principle
of good faith and usage in transactions pervades all European codes.
It is primarily on this principle that the theory of prohibition of the
abuse of right rests in laws where there is no express provision for such
prohibition, as in the German Civil Code. But this principle also
expresses something else. Along with a host of other provisions in
European codes on more specific matters, the principle of good faith
expresses the idea of equity which - though it does not have in those
codes the formal procedural character it has under the Common Law
system - nevertheless has a substantial significance and ultimately
becomes the essential companion of the juristic syllogism in inter-
preting the rules of law.
In fact, equity, which as "epieikeia" was first revealed in ancient
Greek philosophy and particularly in Aristotle's teachings, was fi-
nally embedded in Roman Law as "aequitas", synonymous with Nat-
ural Law and Justice, and came to mean a complex of ethical and
moral precepts, such as good faith, fairness in transactions, human-
ity, generosity, even flexibility, namely, elements that help to adjust
[Vol. 34
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the specific case of legal relationship to a general and abstract rule
of law. 15
This equity as a substantive, not merely procedural, element
which wells up from the contents of modern European codes is one
of the primary elements of the spirit of European culture imprinted
in those codes. Its ethical and moral significance imparts ethical and
moral force to those codes and is perhaps one of the most substantive
elements of the legacy of the world of Civil Law - the ultimate
remedy in the interpretation of Law, as ingeniously defined in the
famous article 21 of Louisiana Civil Code. 6 This Equity is of Greek,
Roman, and Christian origin. And these three ingredients actually
constitute the essence of modern European culture which, in the
realm of law, has been enriched with Frankish and Germanic
elements.
Insofar as the law is concerned, this amalgam of Roman, Greek,
Christian and other elements, certainly retains its marked Roman
character. We have only to think of the terminology, the technique
and the logical structure and systematization of modern Civil Law to
grasp the significance of Roman tradition, that Roman tradition
which experienced a deep refolding during the development from the
times of the Glossators through the period of the great codifications.
It was from this refolding, to which all the varied elements noted
above have contributed, that is, from the elaboration of the Roman
tradition over the long centuries of that European development, that
emerged the spirit and meaning of Civil Law, its ethical and moral
force, which gives it a particular color and constitutes the brilliant
"Legacy of Civil Law" to our modern civilization; a legacy whose
cultural character acquires a weighty importance when compared
with the equally brilliant Common Law, similarly founded on homo-
geneous cultural elements. From the synthesis of these two worlds of
law, separate and yet alike in their cultural constitution, that is, from
the synthesis of Civil Law and Common Law, we can reliably hope
to attain the desired objective of a unification of legal life in this
15. The bibliography on Equity is very rich. See with mention of further
bibliography, G. HUMBERT, V* AEQUITAS, 1 DIC'rIONNAIRE DES ANTIQUI's GRECQUES ET
ROMAINES 108 (1877); E. JONKERS, V0 AEQUITAS, 1 REALLEXIKON FUR ANTIKE UND
CHRISTENTUM 141 (1950); M. KASER, 1 ROMISCHES PRIVATRECHT 172 (1955); C. ALLEN,
LAW IN THE MAKING 305 (3d ed. 1939); J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW
302 (2d ed. 1938); A. GUARINO, Equita (diritto romano), Novissima Digesto Italiano
(estratto).
16. LA. CIv. CODE art. 21: "In all civil matters, where there is no express law, the
judge is bound to proceed and decide according to equity. To decide equitably, an
appeal is to be made to natural law and reason, or received usages, where positive law
is silent."
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constantly troubled but still unflaggingly vigorous world of ours. This
synthesis already appears in this State where Common Law and Civil
Law ideas coexist in a remarkable way, as the Louisiana Civil Code
is interpreted with the spirit of both the Civil Law and the Common
Law systems.
